ICALEPCS2015 - List of Authors (Andersson, R.)

Paper	Title	Page
MOPGF126	A Modified Functional Safety Method for Predicting False Beam Trips and Blind Failures in the Design Phase of the ESS Beam Interlock System	378
	R. Andersson, E. Bargalló, A. Monera Martinez, A. Nordt ESS, Lund, Sweden
	As accelerators are becoming increasingly powerful, the requirement of a reliable machine protection system is apparent to avoid beam-induced damage to the equipment. A missed detection of a hazard is undesirable as it could lead to equipment damage on very short time scales. In addition, the number of false beam trips, leading to unnecessary downtime, should be kept at a minimum to achieve user satisfaction. This paper describes a method for predicting and mitigating these faults, based on the architecture of the system. The method is greatly influenced by the IEC61508 standard for functional safety for the industry and implements a Failure Mode, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA). It is suggested that this method is applied at an early stage in the design phase of a high-power accelerator, so that possible protection and mitigation can be suggested and implemented in the interlock system logic. The method described in this paper is currently applied at the European Spallation Source and the results follow from the analysis on the Beam Interlock System of this facility.
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MOPGF138	Overview and Design Status of the Fast Beam Interlock System at ESS	409
	A. Monera Martinez, R. Andersson, A. Nordt, M. Zaera-Sanz ESS, Lund, Sweden C. Hilbes ZHAW, Winterthur, Switzerland
	The ESS, consisting of a pulsed proton linear accelerator, a rotating spallation target designed for an average beam power of up to 5 MW, and a suite of neutron instruments, requires a large variety of instrumentation, both for controlling as well as protecting the different hardware systems and the beam. The ESS beam power is unprecedented and an uncontrolled release could lead to serious damage of equipment installed along the tunnel and target station within only a few microseconds. Major failures of certain equipment will result in long repair times, because it is delicate and difficult to access and sometimes located in high radiation areas. To optimize the operational efficiency of the facility, accidents should be avoided and interruptions should be rare and limited to a short time. Hence, a sophisticated machine protection system is required. In order to stop efficiently the proton beam production in case of failures, a Fast Beam Interlock (FBI) system with a targeted reaction time of less than 5 microseconds and very high dependability is being designed. The design approach for this FPGA-based interlock system will be presented as well as the status on prototyping.
	Poster MOPGF138 [2.416 MB]
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TUC3O03	Development and Realisation of the ESS Machine Protection Concept	545
	A. Nordt, R. Andersson, T. Korhonen, A. Monera Martinez, M. Zaera-Sanz ESS, Lund, Sweden A. Apollonio, R. Schmidt CERN, Geneva, Switzerland C. Hilbes ZHAW, Winterthur, Switzerland
	ESS is facing extremely high beam availability requirements and is largely relying on custom made, very specialised, and expensive equipment for its operation. The proton beam power with an average of 5MW per pulse will be unprecedented and its uncontrolled release can lead to serious damage of the delicate equipment, causing long shutdown periods, inducing high financial losses and, as a main point, interfering drastically with international scientific research programs relying on ESS operation. Implementing a fit-for-purpose machine protection concept is one of the key challenges in order to mitigate these risks. The development and realisation of the measures needed to implement such concept to the correct level in case of a complex facility like the ESS, requires a systematic approach, and will be discussed in this paper.
	Slides TUC3O03 [11.931 MB]
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FRB3O02	Status of the European Spallation Source Control System	1177
	T. Korhonen, R. Andersson, F. Bellorini, S.L. Birch, D.P. Brodrick, H. Carling, J. Cereijo García, R.N. Fernandes, L. Fernandez, B. Gallese, S.R. Gysin, E. Laface, N. Levchenko, M. Mansouri Sharifabad, A. Monera Martinez, R. Mudingay, A. Nordt, D. Paulic, D.P. Piso, K. Rathsman, M. Reščič, G. Trahern, M. Zaera-Sanz ESS, Lund, Sweden N. Claesson, U. Rojec, K. Strniša, A.A. Söderqvist Cosylab, Ljubljana, Slovenia
	The European Spallation Source (ESS) is a collaboration of 17 European countries to build the world's most powerful neutron source for research. ESS has entered the construction phase and the plan is to produce first neutrons by 2019 and to complete the construction by 2025. The Integrated Control System Division (ICS) is responsible to provide control systems for the whole facility. The unprecented beam power of 5 MW and the construction of the facility with many components contributed in-kind presents a number of challenges to the control system. Systems have to be specified so that the work can be effectively shared between the contributors and on-site staff. Control system components need to provide a level of performance that can support the operation of the facility, be standardized so that integration to the facility can be done during a short installation period and be maintainable by the in-house staff after the construction has finished. This paper will outline the plans and principles that will be used to construct the control systems. The selected technologies and standards will be presented, as well as the plans for integration.
	Slides FRB3O02 [1.184 MB]
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Paper

Title

Page

A Modified Functional Safety Method for Predicting False Beam Trips and Blind Failures in the Design Phase of the ESS Beam Interlock System

378

R. Andersson, E. Bargalló, A. Monera Martinez, A. Nordt
ESS, Lund, Sweden

As accelerators are becoming increasingly powerful, the requirement of a reliable machine protection system is apparent to avoid beam-induced damage to the equipment. A missed detection of a hazard is undesirable as it could lead to equipment damage on very short time scales. In addition, the number of false beam trips, leading to unnecessary downtime, should be kept at a minimum to achieve user satisfaction. This paper describes a method for predicting and mitigating these faults, based on the architecture of the system. The method is greatly influenced by the IEC61508 standard for functional safety for the industry and implements a Failure Mode, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA). It is suggested that this method is applied at an early stage in the design phase of a high-power accelerator, so that possible protection and mitigation can be suggested and implemented in the interlock system logic. The method described in this paper is currently applied at the European Spallation Source and the results follow from the analysis on the Beam Interlock System of this facility.

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reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

MOPGF138

Overview and Design Status of the Fast Beam Interlock System at ESS

409

A. Monera Martinez, R. Andersson, A. Nordt, M. Zaera-Sanz
ESS, Lund, Sweden
C. Hilbes
ZHAW, Winterthur, Switzerland

The ESS, consisting of a pulsed proton linear accelerator, a rotating spallation target designed for an average beam power of up to 5 MW, and a suite of neutron instruments, requires a large variety of instrumentation, both for controlling as well as protecting the different hardware systems and the beam. The ESS beam power is unprecedented and an uncontrolled release could lead to serious damage of equipment installed along the tunnel and target station within only a few microseconds. Major failures of certain equipment will result in long repair times, because it is delicate and difficult to access and sometimes located in high radiation areas. To optimize the operational efficiency of the facility, accidents should be avoided and interruptions should be rare and limited to a short time. Hence, a sophisticated machine protection system is required. In order to stop efficiently the proton beam production in case of failures, a Fast Beam Interlock (FBI) system with a targeted reaction time of less than 5 microseconds and very high dependability is being designed. The design approach for this FPGA-based interlock system will be presented as well as the status on prototyping.

Poster MOPGF138 [2.416 MB]

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reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TUC3O03

Development and Realisation of the ESS Machine Protection Concept

545

A. Nordt, R. Andersson, T. Korhonen, A. Monera Martinez, M. Zaera-Sanz
ESS, Lund, Sweden
A. Apollonio, R. Schmidt
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
C. Hilbes
ZHAW, Winterthur, Switzerland

ESS is facing extremely high beam availability requirements and is largely relying on custom made, very specialised, and expensive equipment for its operation. The proton beam power with an average of 5MW per pulse will be unprecedented and its uncontrolled release can lead to serious damage of the delicate equipment, causing long shutdown periods, inducing high financial losses and, as a main point, interfering drastically with international scientific research programs relying on ESS operation. Implementing a fit-for-purpose machine protection concept is one of the key challenges in order to mitigate these risks. The development and realisation of the measures needed to implement such concept to the correct level in case of a complex facility like the ESS, requires a systematic approach, and will be discussed in this paper.

Slides TUC3O03 [11.931 MB]

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reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

FRB3O02

Status of the European Spallation Source Control System

1177

T. Korhonen, R. Andersson, F. Bellorini, S.L. Birch, D.P. Brodrick, H. Carling, J. Cereijo García, R.N. Fernandes, L. Fernandez, B. Gallese, S.R. Gysin, E. Laface, N. Levchenko, M. Mansouri Sharifabad, A. Monera Martinez, R. Mudingay, A. Nordt, D. Paulic, D.P. Piso, K. Rathsman, M. Reščič, G. Trahern, M. Zaera-Sanz
ESS, Lund, Sweden
N. Claesson, U. Rojec, K. Strniša, A.A. Söderqvist
Cosylab, Ljubljana, Slovenia

The European Spallation Source (ESS) is a collaboration of 17 European countries to build the world's most powerful neutron source for research. ESS has entered the construction phase and the plan is to produce first neutrons by 2019 and to complete the construction by 2025. The Integrated Control System Division (ICS) is responsible to provide control systems for the whole facility. The unprecented beam power of 5 MW and the construction of the facility with many components contributed in-kind presents a number of challenges to the control system. Systems have to be specified so that the work can be effectively shared between the contributors and on-site staff. Control system components need to provide a level of performance that can support the operation of the facility, be standardized so that integration to the facility can be done during a short installation period and be maintainable by the in-house staff after the construction has finished. This paper will outline the plans and principles that will be used to construct the control systems. The selected technologies and standards will be presented, as well as the plans for integration.

Slides FRB3O02 [1.184 MB]

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reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)