



It receives alarms from beam losse monitors, beam intensity and energy diagnostics, beam dump and targets control parameters.

Therefore, it activates the beam cut through commands sent to safe and slow beam stops in the low energy beam line in association with a temporary RF stop on the RFQ. It is based on a redundant hard wired system as shown.

MACHINE PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR SPIRAL2 Presented by C.Berthe, E.Lecorche, M-H Moscatello, G.Normand

The SPIRAL2 facility under construction at Ganil will The SPIRAL2 Machine Protection System is extend the possibilities for experimental nuclear currently under design for a realization physics towards more exotic beams. scheduled in 2014. The technical complexity of the SPIRAL2 system is directly linked to The primary stable beams (deuterons, protons, light) and heavy ions) accelerated by the Linac will range the large variety of accelerated beams, in terms of intensities (several orders of from a few 10 mA to 5 μ A in intensities, and from 0,75 magnitude) and energies, and to the beam A.MeV up to 14,5A.MeV for heavy ions, 20 A.MeV for time structure, which may vary in a very large deuterons and 33 MeV for protons in energies. bandwidth. The MPS will have to be in operation for the second semester of 2014, when starting the SPIRAL 2 commissioning.

The Machine Protection System (MPS) has thus to be designed to monitor a very large beam power range: a few 100W up to 200 kW.

Functional scheme of the SPIRAL2 MPS

References

P.Bertrand, "SPIRAL2 Accelerator construction progress", LINAC2012, Tel-Aviv, Israel, p773. (2012) MH, Moscatello "Machine Protection System for the Spril2 facility", IPAC2012, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, p2612. (2012) C.Sibley, "Machine Protection Strategies for high power accelerators", IPAC2003, Portland, USA, p.607 (2003) F.Pellemoine, "Preliminary thermal calculation", SPIRAL2 Internal Report, ref. EDMS I-027629V1 C.Berthe, "Machine Modes implementation and Run Permit System", SPIRAL2 Internal Report, ref. EDMS I-027794V2 C.Jamet, "Beam intensity an energy control for the Spiral2 facility", LINAC2012, Tel-Aviv, Israel, p. 537(2012) L.Philippe,"User interface for Spiral 2 Machine Protection", this conference





Machine mo Beam typ Beam pa Beam pov





		GD + CB – 1	1/12/12					
	CONFIGURATION PANEL	Run Permit System						
	MODE Selector Source	Hard wired system with keys						
	Injector Beam Dump	MACHINE PATH						
	AEL / Prod							
BE3	KEY INJECTOR 1/2	KEY_NFS_Neutron_target 🔌						
BE1	Hardwired action on dipole	I KEY NFS without target						
I	KEY / Selector	BEAM DUMP						
		KEY S3 N Actinide						
<u> </u>	Commutation Grid	KEY S3 N without Actinide CF	F1 F2					
BE2	li i	KEY S3 S	_					
ners	Hard wired action on dipole	KEY S3 S						
-		I KEY Prod Conv 200 KW						
		KEY Prod Conv 50 KW						
		KEY Prod No Conv						
	I I The key status authorise	es the commutation besides other conditions						

	TF : Deutons		Mode PF (KW)	>	0.3	1	2	6	10	50	200
	Type CM	CM	Mode CM								
al a	Source	2	source ions légers → LBE2-CF11		X						
ae	Injecteur	4	source ions légers → LME-CF21		Х	X					
		6	source ions légers → BTI-AF		Х	X	X	X	?		
	Beam Dump	8	source ions légers → beam dump	3	Х	X	х				
)		9	source ions légers → salle rouge conv50	3	Х	X	Х	X	х	Х	
		10	source ions légers → salle rouge conv200		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
ר ו	Production	11	source ions légers → salle rouge noconv	-	Х	X	X	X	X		
	-										
/er		17	source ions légers → NFS-cible-neutrons		X	X	Х		7		
	AEL	20	source ions légers → NFS-irradiation		Х	X	X		_		
		22	source ions légers → SRI		X	X	X				



General scheme of SPIRAL2 protection systems



The Classified Protection system is based on the association of a PLC with two redundant hard wired systems. The first one is a part of the Enlarged system, and the redundant part is an electronic device based on a 7400 series

To respect the requirements of IEC 61508 standard, a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was made to eliminate dangerous failures. The single failure criterion was selected as reliability criterion.