ICALEPCS2013 - List of Authors (Havart, F.)

Paper

Title

Page

Personnel Protection of the CERN SPS North Hall in Fixed Target Primary Ion Mode

66

T. Hakulinen, J. Axensalva, F. Havart, S.C. Hutchins, L.K. Jensen, D. Manglunki, P. Ninin, P. Odier, S.B. Reignier, J.P. Ridewood, L. Søby, C. Theis, F. Valentini, D. Vaxelaire, H. Vincke
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland

While CERN's Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) is able to deliver both secondary proton and primary ion beams to fixed targets in the North Area, the experimental areas (North Hall) are widely accessible during beam. In ion mode all normal safety elements involved in producing secondary beams are removed, so that an accidental extraction of a high-intensity proton beam into the North Hall would expose personnel present there to a radiation hazard. This has required an injector reconfiguration restricting operation to either ions or protons. However, demands for operational flexibility of CERN accelerators have led to a need to mix within the same SPS super-cycle both high-intensity proton cycles for LHC or HiRadMat and ion cycles for the North Area. We present an active interlock designed to mitigate this hazard: Beam Current Transformers are used to measure the level of beam intensity, and if above a set threshold, pulsing of the extraction septa is vetoed. The safety function is implemented by means of two logically equivalent but diverse and separate interlock chains. This interlock is expected to be in place once the SPS resumes operation after the first Long Shutdown in 2014.

Slides MOMIB06 [0.236 MB]

Poster MOMIB06 [4.250 MB]

MOPPC057

Data Management and Tools for the Access to the Radiological Areas at CERN

226

E. Sanchez-Corral Mena, P. Carbonez, A. Dorsival, G. Dumont, K. Foraz, T. Hakulinen, F. Havart, M.P. Kepinski, S. Mallon Amerigo, P. Martel, P. Ninin, R. Nunes, F. Valentini, J. Vollaire
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland

As part of the refurbishment of the PS Personnel Protection system, the radioprotection (RP) buffer zones & equipment have been incorporated into the design of the new access points providing an integrated access concept to the radiation controlled areas of the PS complex. The integration of the RP and access control equipment has been very challenging due to the lack of space in many of the zones. Although successfully carried out, our experience from the commissioning of the first installed access points shows that the integration should also include the software tools and procedures. This paper presents an inventory of all the tools and data bases currently used (*) in order to ensure the access to the CERN radiological areas according to CERN’s safety and radioprotection procedures. We summarize the problems and limitations of each tool as well as the whole process, and propose a number of improvements for the different kinds of users including changes required in each of the tools. The aim is to optimize the access process and the operation & maintenance of the related tools by rationalizing and better integrating them.
(*) Access Distribution and Management, Safety Information Registration, Works Coordination, Access Control, Operational Dosimeter, Traceability of Radioactive Equipment, Safety Information Panel.

Poster MOPPC057 [1.955 MB]

MOPPC061

Achieving a Highly Configurable Personnel Protection System for Experimental Areas

238

F. Havart, D. Chapuis, R. Nunes, D. Vaxelaire
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland

The personnel protection system of the secondary beam experimental areas at CERN manages the beam and access interlocking mechanism. Its aim is to guarantee the safety of the experimental area users against the hazards of beam radiation and laser light. The highly configurable, interconnected, and modular nature of those areas requires a very versatile system. In order to follow closely the operational changes and new experimental setups and to still keep the required level of safety, the system was designed with a set of matrices which can be quickly reconfigured. Through a common paradigm, based on industrial hardware components, this challenging implementation has been made for both the PS and SPS experimental halls, according to the IEC 61508 standard. The current system is based on a set of hypotheses formed during 25 years of operation. Conscious of the constant increase in complexity and the broadening risk spectrum of the present and future experiments, we propose a framework intended as a practical guide to structure the design of the experimental layouts based on risk evaluation, safety function prescriptions and field equipment capabilities.

Poster MOPPC061 [2.241 MB]

Paper	Title	Page
MOMIB06	Personnel Protection of the CERN SPS North Hall in Fixed Target Primary Ion Mode	66
	T. Hakulinen, J. Axensalva, F. Havart, S.C. Hutchins, L.K. Jensen, D. Manglunki, P. Ninin, P. Odier, S.B. Reignier, J.P. Ridewood, L. Søby, C. Theis, F. Valentini, D. Vaxelaire, H. Vincke CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
	While CERN's Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) is able to deliver both secondary proton and primary ion beams to fixed targets in the North Area, the experimental areas (North Hall) are widely accessible during beam. In ion mode all normal safety elements involved in producing secondary beams are removed, so that an accidental extraction of a high-intensity proton beam into the North Hall would expose personnel present there to a radiation hazard. This has required an injector reconfiguration restricting operation to either ions or protons. However, demands for operational flexibility of CERN accelerators have led to a need to mix within the same SPS super-cycle both high-intensity proton cycles for LHC or HiRadMat and ion cycles for the North Area. We present an active interlock designed to mitigate this hazard: Beam Current Transformers are used to measure the level of beam intensity, and if above a set threshold, pulsing of the extraction septa is vetoed. The safety function is implemented by means of two logically equivalent but diverse and separate interlock chains. This interlock is expected to be in place once the SPS resumes operation after the first Long Shutdown in 2014.
	Slides MOMIB06 [0.236 MB]
	Poster MOMIB06 [4.250 MB]

MOPPC057	Data Management and Tools for the Access to the Radiological Areas at CERN	226
	E. Sanchez-Corral Mena, P. Carbonez, A. Dorsival, G. Dumont, K. Foraz, T. Hakulinen, F. Havart, M.P. Kepinski, S. Mallon Amerigo, P. Martel, P. Ninin, R. Nunes, F. Valentini, J. Vollaire CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
	As part of the refurbishment of the PS Personnel Protection system, the radioprotection (RP) buffer zones & equipment have been incorporated into the design of the new access points providing an integrated access concept to the radiation controlled areas of the PS complex. The integration of the RP and access control equipment has been very challenging due to the lack of space in many of the zones. Although successfully carried out, our experience from the commissioning of the first installed access points shows that the integration should also include the software tools and procedures. This paper presents an inventory of all the tools and data bases currently used () in order to ensure the access to the CERN radiological areas according to CERN’s safety and radioprotection procedures. We summarize the problems and limitations of each tool as well as the whole process, and propose a number of improvements for the different kinds of users including changes required in each of the tools. The aim is to optimize the access process and the operation & maintenance of the related tools by rationalizing and better integrating them. () Access Distribution and Management, Safety Information Registration, Works Coordination, Access Control, Operational Dosimeter, Traceability of Radioactive Equipment, Safety Information Panel.
	Poster MOPPC057 [1.955 MB]

MOPPC061	Achieving a Highly Configurable Personnel Protection System for Experimental Areas	238
	F. Havart, D. Chapuis, R. Nunes, D. Vaxelaire CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
	The personnel protection system of the secondary beam experimental areas at CERN manages the beam and access interlocking mechanism. Its aim is to guarantee the safety of the experimental area users against the hazards of beam radiation and laser light. The highly configurable, interconnected, and modular nature of those areas requires a very versatile system. In order to follow closely the operational changes and new experimental setups and to still keep the required level of safety, the system was designed with a set of matrices which can be quickly reconfigured. Through a common paradigm, based on industrial hardware components, this challenging implementation has been made for both the PS and SPS experimental halls, according to the IEC 61508 standard. The current system is based on a set of hypotheses formed during 25 years of operation. Conscious of the constant increase in complexity and the broadening risk spectrum of the present and future experiments, we propose a framework intended as a practical guide to structure the design of the experimental layouts based on risk evaluation, safety function prescriptions and field equipment capabilities.
	Poster MOPPC061 [2.241 MB]