| Paper |
Title |
Page |
| MOPLT018 |
Aperture and Delivery Precision of the LHC Injection System
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572 |
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- B. Goddard, M. Gyr, J.-B. Jeanneret, V. Kain, M. Lamont, V. Maire, V. Mertens, J. Wenninger
CERN, Geneva
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The main LHC injection elements in interaction regions 2 and 8 comprise the injection septa (MSI), the injection kicker (MKI), together with three families of passive protection devices (TDI, TCDD and TCLI). The apertures of the injection septa for the injected and two circulating beams are detailed with a new enlarged vacuum chamber and final septum alignment. The circulating beam aperture of the TDI is detailed with a new TDI support design and modified vacuum tank alignment. A modified TCDD shape is also presented and the implications for the aperture and protection level discussed. The various errors in the SPS, the transfer lines and the injection system, which contribute to injection errors, are analysed, and the expected performance of the system is derived, in terms of the expected delivery precision of the injected beam.
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| MOPLT034 |
Possible Causes and Consequences of Serious Failures of the LHC Machine Protection System
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620 |
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- J.A. Uythoven, R. Filippini, B. Goddard, M. Gyr, V. Kain, R. Schmidt, J. Wenninger
CERN, Geneva
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The LHC machine protection systems, including the beam dumping system, are designed to ensure that failures leading to serious damage to the LHC during its lifetime are extremely unlikely. These kind of failures have to date been considered as being ?beyond the design case?, for instance requiring a combination of equipment failure and surveillance failure. However, they need to be evaluated to determine the required safety levels of the protection systems. A second objective is to understand if measures can and should be taken to further reduce the probability of such failures, or to minimise their impact. This paper considers various serious failure modes of the different machine protection systems. The probable consequences and possible ameliorating measures of the worst-case scenarios are discussed. The particular case of having a stored beam with an unavailable beam dumping system is mentioned, together with possible actions to be taken in such an event.
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